

FACING »ANOTHER MODERNITY«

INDIVIDUALIZATION AND POSTTRADITIONAL LIGATURES

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1. FEARS THAT DRIVE US: CHANGE OR ANOMIA?

There has always been social change. One can even assert that change is a typical, indeed, a necessary characteristic of social relations, that a defective capacity of change rather produces problems, and perhaps even has to be interpreted as a sign of an impending decline. However, change that doesn't take place gradually and beneath the surface but rather manifests itself distinctly generates feelings of anxiety: known structures, which promised security and stability, are coming apart, and this dissolution seems menacing. Is it surprising therefore – in the face of an enormous acceleration in the pace of change – that it is not just with hope and optimism that we are looking into the future? Is it surprising that the »dromological«, intoxicating velocity of modernization, which we are currently experiencing (see 1), and the risks of modernization, of which we are thus becoming so much more acutely aware, are making us afraid? (See currently also 2)

Fear, of course, is not a new phenomenon. It accompanies mankind throughout its history, and the origin of the modern world stands directly in a substantive relation with it. To escape fear and to establish reason in its place was a central motivating force of the Enlightenment (see 3). But the rationalistic suppression of fear in the wake of the process of Enlightenment effected its latent amplification rather than its conquest: »Enlightenment« is, as Horkheimer and Adorno revealed, »mythic fear turned radical« (4: ch. 1). The analysis of fear is, therefore, a crucial key to the understanding of current social, political and historical developments (see also 5). Yet, modern Enlightenment thought can acknowledge this fear only with difficulty. The fixation on reason, the flight into the rationalistic »iron cage« (Weber), was the course entered upon by the modern movement. It created a new »*Cosmopolis*« (6), which replaced the old order, that was threatened by collapse, with new constructions of order.

In this way, one must understand the history of the Enlightenment also as a fear-driven »war against ambivalence«. For everything indistinct and ambiguous endangers modern order, which is founded on unequivocalness. It causes fear and must be assailed. The modern movement can, however, not escape fear and the ambivalence that gives rise to it: Every definition and every attempt at demarcation and order evokes new possibilities of ambivalence and new dis-orders (7). Moreover, it is impossible for reason to rationally define its own fundamental principles (and consequently it is simultaneously always pointing beyond itself). Inevitably it recognizes thus its own contingency, and so time and again compulsion and power are perforce substituted for rational discourses in order to enforce the principles of rationality. Dialectically opposed to the »liberating« powers of reflection stand »immense« powers of subjection, repression and ideological as well as »praxological« deflection (see 8).

Enlightenment, therefore, is antagonistic to itself, it undermines its »grounds« by directing radicalized reason against its own principles, and instead of the liberation of man »from his self-imposed immaturity« (9) it demands subjection to the constraints of the rationalistic order. In this context Agnes Heller speaks of a latent »death wish« of modernity and remarks: »Products of Western culture turn against their own traditions and develop suicidal inclinations.« (10: 40) Yet, Heller also points out how this »death wish« can be reshaped into a new »will to live«, especially if the consciousness of contingency, evidently demanded by reason, too, is acknowledged as »destiny«. And: »[...] it is only modern society that can transform its contingency into its destiny, because it is only now that we have arrived at the consciousness of contingency.« (10: 41) It is a matter, then, of recognizing contingency and ambivalence instead of combatting them – simply in order to disclose the existing space of opportunity and, thus, to understand society and its transformations as a self-creative process (see also 11 and 12).

From this perspective the current situation appears less as a process of dissolution but rather as a process of restructuring that opens new ways of shaping society. It is, strictly speaking, the old question of sociology, which today is posed anew: change or anomia? For when one looks at the work of sociological »classicists« like Durkheim (see 13) or Tönnies (see 14), one will discover that it is exactly this question that stood at the core of their studies of society. Starting from different directions they both reached to the conclusion that modern society, exactly like the traditional order, is dependent on forms of solidarity and cohesion. This solidarity, however, can no longer be presupposed »automatically«, without question, it must be actively established – by means of newly created social institutions. Yet, in the interim, our world has changed considerably (again), and the persistence of many modern institutions (such as the welfare state and the bourgeois nuclear family) is threatened or at least placed into question. So we must ask ourselves: What is it, nowadays, that gives society – as a conjoined »community« – its *raison d'être* and cohesion? In order to approach this question, let us take a closer look at those crucial processes of transformation which shape the world of today.

2. THE CURRENT TRANSFORMATION OF SOCIETY

After the end of the east-west conflict, which symbolically culminated in the fall of the Berlin Wall, there were significant voices, which – probably somewhat prematurely – proclaimed »*The End of History*« (15). Today, these voices have mostly become silent. As it seems: We have, after a short »time-out«, returned into history. One can even assert that the processes of (historical and social) change, fostered exactly by the events of those days, have accelerated enormously. Therefore, some observers speak of another »rupture of epochs«, of a discontinuity in the modern world that can be experienced (see 16). However the case may be, in our opinion, there are three crucial moments of change: the globalization of politics, economy and culture, the changes in information technology, and the revolution in genetic engineering.

A) THE GLOBALIZATION OF POLITICS, ECONOMY AND CULTURE

»Globalization« is a term that has only recently become widespread – whereas the phenomenon that it designates can be traced back far into the past. Therefore, it was rightly emphasized by George Modelski that (political) processes of globalization had already begun in the Middle Ages (see 17). Thus, in the course of time, there came about a globally networked system of states. Today there exists alongside of and parallel with the state-centred system of international politics, which is represented by institutions like the »United Nations«, an even more powerful globally networked multi-centric system of non-governmental actors (see 18 as well as 19), for which the term »*World-Society*« (20) possesses a certain justification (see also 21). However, the politics of the institutional (nation-)state lag behind especially this latest development (see 22: 179) and they therefore contribute to their own critical scrutiny and decline. That's true though it does not mean the final »End of Nation State« (23): Even in view of efforts towards regionalisation, as in the »European Union«, the nation state has not yet been replaced as the defining structural moment of world politics (see e.g. 24 and 25).

Naturally, when speaking of globalization, we – whether euphorically or in a critical vein – most often refer to economic processes rather than the sphere of politics. Here, too, »real« history does not begin at present but can be traced far back into the past. For already in antiquity, but especially since early modern times, there existed strong commercial relations, which reached as far as the world known at that time (see 26: ch. 2). Particularly in the era of imperialism, in the 19th century, worldwide commerce was flourishing – because the gold standard provided for security and the »unequal exchange« (Emmanuel) between the colonies and the imperialist nations guaranteed enormous profits (see 26). It is not surprising therefore that Marx and Engels in »*The Communist Manifesto*« could already in 1848 portray a picture of a highly globalized economy. Yet, the development of international trade suffered considerable setbacks – on account of the First World War, which resulted in the total breakdown of the gold standard, and then once again in the 1970s, evoked by the oil crisis. This relative level of internationalization/globalization attained in the commercial sector at the beginning of the 20th century would only be reached again in the middle of the 1980s (see 27).

On the strength of such data, the argument for globalization has come under fire from many sides (see e.g. 28). If one, however, considers more recent figures and developments, there can be no doubt that international trade relations have reached levels unknown in the past. Especially the globalization of financial markets is making forward strides. »Virtual« capital transactions, electronically sustained, are made at delirious speed around the globe and on an immense scale (see 29). A highly accelerated »flexible« capitalism is emerging at present. The regime of flexibility even dominates the field of production, and (virtual) services and the culture industry, the global »economy of signs« (30), are becoming increasingly important, too.

In the wake of economic globalization, the logic of capital penetrates more and more social spheres, particularly culture (see 31) – which can be interpreted as a rather one-sided development in the sense of an »Americanization« (see e.g. the contributions in 32). On the other hand, there are arguments that the global flows of capital and signs, of work (force) and ideas etc. increasingly uncouple from one another, and local counter movements arise (see 33). In consequence, globalization cannot be considered as a merely political and/or economic process. Cultural globalization is undoubtedly a moment of equal importance, and its effects – not in spite of, but rather due to the dialectics of globalization and localization – a global consciousness (see 34 and 35). This global consciousness is an indispensable necessity for current social theory, too (see e.g. 36). According to Martin Albrow we are already in a new: »*The Global Age*« (37).

B) INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY CHANGES

The processes of globalization mentioned above are undoubtedly to a large extent animated and sustained by the (further) development of new information and communication technologies. Although, the information technology changes – being historically the »*Third Wave*« (38) of *technological innovation* – constitute an independent factor. Computerization, digital networking, and interactive media etc. transform the face of our society on the local level as well as on a global scale, and this transformative potential has since long been clearly observed in the social sciences and humanities:

Perhaps when Alain Touraine (39) or Daniel Bell (40) at the end of the 1960s and the beginning of the 1970s spoke of a »post-industrial society«, they wished not only to express that the service sector had overtaken significantly industrial production but above all to point out that knowledge and information play a crucial role in all social domains. Jean-Francois Lyotard established only a few years later, in the face of the increased circulation of computers and information technology, the concept of a »*computerized society*«: all inventories of knowledge are translated into the binary digital code and thus become economically easily accessible and exploitable, too – which is why knowledge has become a sought-after and highly contested commodity. This commodification and computerization of knowledge is the »*condition postmoderne*« (41) – full of conflicts and crises.

If we agree with Jean Baudrillard, the latent instability of post-modern conditions has now (re)stabilized itself by means of information technological virtualization and media-supported simulation. In the age of the »*simulacrum*«, proclaimed by Baudrillard, in which the real and the imaginary – supposedly – are fused into a common operational totality, a wide range of *possibilities for manipulation* do exist (see 42). The change in information technology may, therefore, be seen as a »*Control Revolution*« (43), which was especially necessary in order

to get a hold on the consequences of the industrial revolution – i.e. the risk-laden ecological, economic and social »side-effects« of industrialization (see 44).

The »High-Tech Society« (45), originating in the wake of the information technological control revolution, at whose core stand technologies and developments like microelectronics, robot-based production, electronic commerce, telecommunication, artificial intelligence and new media like the »world wide web« or »video on demand« etc. (see in an overview 46), is, however, not an exclusive (although very much an excluding) phenomenon of the western industrial nations. Its patterns are spreading globally – pervading into and infiltrating even regions of the globe thought of as »peripheral« (see in critical discussion 47). This way, a world-wide information technological network emerges. It captures not only the local, but it colonizes all social domains: contours of a »network society« do evolve, and real space, the »space of places«, becomes increasingly transformed by the global flows of capital, information and images: the »space of flows«. The virtual thus turns out to be the defining »reality« (see 48 and additionally 49). In this »CyberSociety« (50) – through the convergence of the most various technologies (see 51) – a virtual social sphere is created, which possesses, to be sure, still a »spatial« character. However, it bursts apart the usual patterns of mapping and orientation (see 52 and 53).

C) THE REVOLUTION IN GENETIC ENGINEERING

The development in the »life sciences« is proceeding forward with giant strides, too, and reports like that of the decoding of the human genome draw much media attention. This revolution, however, is not reflected as thoroughly and expensively within sociological discourse as are globalization and the changes in information technology. This is all the more surprising since some »classics« of sociology, like e.g. Herbert Spencer and his evolutionism (see 54), explicitly refer to biological models, and metaphors of the body pervade sociological as well as political language (see 55). In biology itself, one is absolutely sensitive to the social and ethical questions of genetic engineering and enters into the interdisciplinary discourse (see e.g. 56 or 57). But, of course, the biotechnology debate has not completely passed by the social sciences and humanities, and especially today one can observe a flourishing of this subject, which includes that the potential for change inherent in these technologies is featured quite prominently. Rifkin, for example, speaks of the »Biotech Century« (58), and Sylvester and Klotz have even already proclaimed the »Gene Age« (59). Such »exaggerations« correspond with the public perception: Many hold the gene as an »icon« of – brave? – new world (see 60), and sometimes biologists are – falsely – coming to be celebrated as the prophets of a new doctrine of liberation (see so 61).

How do such contradictory judgements come about? Since the DNA was »discovered« by Crick and Watson as carrier of the »code of life« in 1953, bio-technological progress – sustained

by techniques like the enzymatic »slicing« of DNA or its amplification by means of PCR (Polymerase Chain Reaction) – lead towards ever more complex organisms and manipulations: the focus of genetic engineering was enlarged from micro-organisms to plants to animals and human beings. Being initially rather a curious game, today one can precisely switch genes on and off or transfer them from one species to another. Especially this capacity turns genetics into a key technology and driving force of change in post-industrial society. However, the social acceptance of a manipulation of the human genome is, of course, essentially lower than e.g. the acceptance of the use of genetically modified bacteria to produce vaccines. (See in an overview 62, 63 and 64)

Genetic engineering can, therefore, be interpreted in different ways, depending on which domain one applies it to or which point of view one takes: gene therapy could be the key to the battle against many diseases; genetic »screening« and prenatal diagnostics could, on the contrary, open the door to a new eugenics. Genetic modifications possibly provide the basis for new, more resistant and higher-yield sorts of plants; but, at the same time, exceeding the boundaries of species represents an uncontrollable risk. Biotechnology thus raises completely new ethical and legal issues and provides us with far reaching technological means for reshaping the environment, which is why it is justified to speak here of an actual revolution (see in addition 65 and 66). The possible effects of (not only) this revolution on the individual and the community will be focussed in what follows.

3. »COMPLEXES« OF TRANSFORMATION: IMPACTS ON THE INDIVIDUAL AND ON THE COMMUNITY

Already the sketchy account of the current transformation processes makes it clear that the ongoing changes are indeed radical. But what concrete impact do they have on the individual and, more importantly, on society as a »cohesive« unit? In the following, light will be cast on these issues – first with respect to the specific field of transformation and then concentrating on their complex combined effects.

A) THE GLOBALIZATION OF INEQUALITY AND THE UNDERMINING OF THE NATIONAL WELFARE STATE

The impact of globalization on the subject and on the community are as diverse and multi-dimensional as this process itself. That's why we focus here on two points we consider essential: Its effect on the texture of social inequality and the undermining of the (national) welfare state, both of which can lead to fission and disembedding processes. For globalization has hardly led to a fairer distribution of capital. On the contrary, it unilaterally links the metropolises, is »located« above all in the »global cities« – New York, London, Tokyo etc. – as nodal points

of the global network (see e.g. 67), and it mainly serves the interests of the multinational corporations (see 68 and 69). Thus, we still have to deal with the separation between periphery and centre, outlined by Wallerstein, though it is perhaps less visible. And inequality on the national level, immense already, has rather more than less increased – in the developing countries (see 70) as well as in the industrial nations of the West (see 71). Global capitalism, which acts according to the principle »*Profit over People*« (72), is therefore increasingly coming under fire.

In global capitalism the centre is no longer built of a relatively homogenous and rather »hermetic« region but rather takes the shape of a networked global structure, which however, is not horizontal and egalitarian, but is con-centrated on a few (globally dispersed) actual places. At the same time, the periphery spreads and diffusely invades the central regions, but remains a »decentred space« – the holes, the empty spaces of the net! – even more isolated. It is the »homestead« to a global »underclass«. So it might happen that in the wake of globalization not only a global consciousness comes into being, but also a new rift unfolds through social space: on the one side there is highly mobile »*Transnational Capitalist Class*« (73), on the other we find a »proletariat« fixated to »locality«. The latter may at times be uprooted from the local ghetto or even lead a »nomadic existence«; in doing so, it does, however, not follow its own impulses, like the individuals of the transnational »new tribe« (see 74), but rather is forced to chase after a new, poorly paid job. Here, again and again, one is confronted with the same hard limits in space – be it just in the form of the »no-go-areas« of exclusive shopping malls, wellness clubs and residential towers, which constitute (more or less) visible borders. Space and the capability to move in it – actually or virtually – becomes thus a defining dimension of social inequality (see also 75, 76, 77 and 78).

Consequently, we are confronted with a paradox: while in the wake of globalization the national boundaries of space – especially for »capital« – increasingly disintegrate, there arise new, possibly even more limiting boundaries in social space. Strictly speaking, it is the liquefaction of capital itself which sets off and reinforces this process of social fission, for it is on account of the unbridled streams of capital flows that the »containers« of the national welfare state begin to »leak« (see 79). The state can no longer take the same stabilizing measures of re-distribution as before, which results in a mounting of inequality and a rise of social tensions (see 80 and 81).

This situation originates above all from a concurrence of the nation states for the attraction of global capital: by competing with each other, the states weaken themselves and limit their spaces of action as well as their economic resources. Subordinating to the logic of markets they lose their already limited political autonomy. And by underbidding each other to attract capital, the total »transfer« that takes place from economy to community diminishes (see also 82). It is, as Altvater notes, a »race without a winner« (83). A homogenization of »*The Three*

Worlds of Welfare Capitalism« (84) is imminent – in the form of a »downward« adjustment: to the »liberal« Anglo-American model.

It is not only for this reason that Lester Thurow takes a rather sceptical view of »*The Future of Capitalism*« and calls the current situation a »period of punctuated equilibrium« (see 85). The runaway »*Disorganized Capitalism*« (86) of the post-fordist era of globalization works like a »global disembedding mechanism«, which increasingly separates economy from its social context, and consequently leads to the transformation and commodification of the entire society and culture (see 87). The ties of solidarity which bound and bind together the Western welfare states are about to tear. Individuals lose their embedment in social space but, at the same time, are confronted with ever new (spatial) boundaries. Even the flight into the virtual worlds of cyberspace does not appear to be a viable solution:

B) THE FRAGMENTATION OF PUBLIC LIFE AND THE FRACTALIZATION OF THE INDIVIDUAL IN THE NEW INFORMATION AND MEDIA SOCIETY

With the changes in information technology, as shown, a virtual transfiguration of real places appears – in any way, at least a virtual »parallel world« arises, the laws and organizational forms of which have been investigated only marginally (see e.g. the approaches in 88). This parallel world can provide new liberties, perhaps when the (confining) cover of identity is modified or slipped off in »cyberspace«. It can, however, have problematic effects leading to a fragmentation of the individual as well as of the public sphere. Especially the latter might at first sound absurd as it is the information technologies that contribute substantially to the formation of a global network. One could thus presume that electronic information networks are more likely to give rise to unifying processes and that an actual global consciousness comes into being. This is, however, only one possible aspect of their effect, the opposite is also true. For as critically as one may consider the division into actors and audience and the »electronically reinforced silence« in the age of mass media (see 89) – they generated nonetheless, through simultaneity, something like a »global village« (see 90). But there is a tendency of the new information technologies to destroy exactly this unifying global simultaneity of the mass media: their interactive capacity facilitates individualization and the temporal delimitation of media use.

This is the effect of yet another paradox. In the current society of knowledge and communication, marked by the exponential increase of information, one might expect an even stronger hierarchy (of knowledge) within the audience than it was the case in industrial mass society – at least according to prevalent opinion (see 91). Brian Loader, for example, speaks of the »information poor« (see 92), who, according to him, form a kind of new »underclass« of computerized society, in which issues of access become crucial (see in addition 93). On the other hand, several empirical studies verify that differences in knowledge have remained rather constant (see 94). In compliance

with a thesis of Ulrich Beck (see 44) one might, therefore, perhaps call it a »elevator-effect«: we all (perforce) are absorbing ever more information. At the same time the relative inequality remains stable (or is even enlarged) – but information use is »lifted« to a higher general level. This shows a significant effect: on account of the generally higher level of information and the new technical possibilities for realizing individual preferences there comes about an *individualization of information patterns and modes of media consumption*, which finally results in a *diffusion and fragmentation of the public sphere*. For one thing is clear: even a disproportionately higher overall willingness to receive information does not suffice to manage the increased information density and latitude; we must be highly selective regarding the information on offer. Subsequently, in spite of the channelling of information flows through the great net portals, the increasing normality of an »audience of one« is a real threat (see 95). This leads to a collapse of the mass media public, and we thus find ourselves »*Beyond the Global Village*« (96).

The public is dissolved – through virtualization, but as political sphere of action, too. It loses its reference to concrete (living) space. The end of the political as a domain of »practise« appears thus a distinct possibility (see also 97). On the other hand, some observers trace in the new media/technologies a considerable democratic potential and point to an »electronic inclusion«: that is a growing consideration even of minorities as well as chances for the creation of a (semi-)direct democracy by means of online referenda etc. (see e.g. 98 or 99). Already today some less formalized active forms of politics are to be found in virtuality, when, for example, »cyberpunks« and »hackers« are trying to realize their notions of absolute freedom of information (quite compatible with neoliberalism) even by illegal means (see 100). One thing, to be sure, holds with certainty: »Information technology is highly political.« (101: 219) And because this is true, more and more regulatory institutions strive for the comprehensive control of content and direction of information flows (see the contributions in 102). Virtual worlds may very well be »elusive« then, but it might easily happen that the unsuspecting »User«, when clicking into the net, is being watched by »Big Brother«.

That recalls memories of dark phantasies: Already Jacques Ellul feared that a technology, turned autonomous, has subjugated man. On account of the mechanization pervading all spheres of life the state subsequently becomes totalitarian. It uses technology to gain control over society and completely absorbs the life of its citizens. And again already to Ellul the final result of this process is a »cyborg«-like thing: human machines. Their life is governed by technology, socially fragmented and without a spiritual moment (see 103). Currently, Jean Baudrillard affirms in a very similar vein the fractalization of the individual by means of simulative »doubling« and notes: »Am I a Man or am I a machine? There is no more answer nowadays to this question: in reality and subjectively I am a Man, but virtually and in fact I am a machine.« (104) Thus, in the virtual phantasm of cyberspace all »material« limits become blurred and a de-centered multiple self arises (see also 105) – the vacuous »realization« of the theoretical method of deconstruction, as it seems (see 106). On an ideological plane, this is shown only too clearly

in texts like Donna Haraway's »*Cyborg-Manifesto*«. She observes: »We are all chimeras, theorized and fabricated hybrids of machine and organism; in short, we are cyborgs.« (107: 150) In contrast to Elull and Baudrillard, this type of bio-technological hybridization (understood at the same time as the description of a reality and as utopian imagination) is welcomed euphorically by Haraway for it opens radically new opportunities for self-design and – technologically generated – self-distanciation: »The cyborg is resolutely committed to partiality, irony, intimacy, and perversity. It is oppositional, utopian, and completely without innocence.« (107: 151)

C) GENETICALLY ENGINEERED »DOUBLES« AND ITS MIRRORS

The cyborg is a biological-technological hybrid. It is built through the fusion of corporeal, mechanical and electronic elements – and thus dissolved as a mere »interface« in virtual space. »Biborgs« represent a new level of hybridization: they are transgenic chimeras, unconstrainedly »assembled« from the available gene pool. And the »biborg« is – to a certain degree – already a reality: gene transfer is a central technique of the new genetics, be it in medical production, where »alien« genes are channelled in micro-organisms in order to produce enzymes and vaccines, or even just as an instructive »play«, when e.g. rabbit cells (by the transfer of the so-called »green fluorescent protein«-gen), suddenly begin to »shine« under the microscope like a certain type of deep sea medusas.

The boundaries of the species begin to become blurred – if one ever could sharply draw them. Perhaps some day it will be considered as »cool« to light up »magically« like that, perhaps it will be a »genetic marker« for deviance. Such technologies could in any case have drastic effects for individuals, their freedom, and community as a whole. Paralleling Donna Haraway, one could celebrate the future as a new age of transgenic chimeras and emphasize how their »impurity« reinforces their consciousness for difference; or demonstrate how the new technologies simply provide creative possibilities for self-design and the overcoming of corporeal limitations, i.e. genetic engineering may compensate for the »Antiquity of Man« (108), his character as a (biologically) »defective existence« (109): Protean dreams, also as the foundation of a new »politics of difference«, which works not against but rather together with genetic engineering, but which deflects »real« problems of finding and maintaining identity in a world of dissolving »fixed points« (see in the context of cyborg 110).

Genetic engineering obtains an especially explosive nature through the foreseeable fusion with information technology: the simplest kind of their combination is computer-aided gene-sequencing and the electronic storage of genetic information – with all the ambiguous effects of such kind of collection of biological data (see below and 58: ch. 6). However, if applied, a conversion from binary digital data encoding to the four-value code of the DNA-bases (adenine, thymine, guanine, cytosine) could represent a revolutionary step ahead. A »biological program-

ming« or »gene-information-technology« would open up the space of multidimensional information, for DNA is not simply a »flat« structure, but three-dimensional and many times coiled (even if the »semantics« of its tertiary structure has still not been sufficiently investigated). The use of DNA would, moreover, be a very safe method of data storage: because the bases are coupled in one pair each, so the information on the DNA is always available (at least) twice. This is why genetic data are so easily duplicated, copied and multiplied. And DNA – the »code of life« – is capable of self-reproduction: knowledge »embodies« itself and the body becomes simultaneously the central metaphor of the (new) science (see also 111).

Yet, genetic engineering enables extraneous-reproduction, too – through cloning. Along with the clone, the multiple personality becomes real, however not, as in the phantasm of virtual space, still integrated into a physical unit, but rather externalized and split, spread out over different (fractal) bodies. Some would surely be terrified by a – futuristic – look at their doubled (but certainly different) clone-self. This is, however, only one of the »monstrous« dimensions of the new genetics. Genetic engineering opens new, comprehensive possibilities of (biological) control: human attributes, if biologically determined, are captured and even become manipulable. Some propose to use these means more actively and to »rearingly« intervene instead of leaving the field to »unlimited« scientific playfulness (see e.g. 112). But in this way (individual) genetic attributes possibly form the basis of a new form of discrimination and eugenics – not to mention »simple« insurance issues, reports of which we already hear today, arising when modern diagnostics detect certain »genetic defects«. The current techniques of biotechnological control are called »genetic screening« and »genetic fingerprinting« etc. Once perfected, they will allow the control and surveillance of even the (genetic) core of personality (see 113).

Still, at present this form of control is likely to be no more than fiction. The »Human Genome Project« is a case in point: it has been an, supposedly successful, attempt to map out the human genome – a Cartesian illusion, for the object of the survey: the human being may prove to be more complex than a »superficial« sequence of bases (see also 114). However, the mapping of the genome bears some very real risks. For this cartographic feat was not first achieved under the auspices of the university scientists of the »Human Genome Project«, but by the scientists of the biotech entrepreneur Craig Venter. His company, »Celera«, already holds patents on a large number of genes that could show to be of economic interest. Consequently, a privatization of the human genome is impending; and that is a danger for the entire global »gene pool« as more and more companies and individuals obtain patents for animal and plant genes (see e.g. 64: ch. 2). Thus, the concentration on potentially profitable genes could bring about an impoverishment, a loss of variety, although attempts like the »Human Genome Diversity Project« seek to counter this (see 115).

Other dangers inherent in genetic engineering are more difficult to rein in: risks such as the uncontrolled »spread« of genes (that had been transferred to agricultural crops) to other species,

or the gentechnological creation and (unintentional) release of »monsters« – be it even of such inconspicuous creatures like heat resistant bacteria. Pandora's Box, which the »de-materialized« economy of the postindustrial age almost seemed to have succeeded in closing, is once again wide open. Genetic engineering contains a reflexive dimension of danger (see also 116). Utopian elements meet with »dystopian« components (see 117); and it is particularly from the fusion and convergence of the various technologies that new »complexes« of change arise.

D) CRITICAL INTERIM RÉSUMÉ: CONVERGENT DISEMBEDDING PROCESSES AND NEGATIVE INDIVIDUALIZATION

When drawing a critical interim résumé, one will conclude: the disembedding processes shown above constitute a transformative »complex«; they converge in a far-reaching »meta change« (see also 16). Globalization and the changes in information technology not only reciprocally reinforce one another while generating comprehensive and yet exclusive global networks. In conjunction, virtual networks and gentechnological »coding«, too, do cause a much stronger impulse for change than separate. For combined they create, as shown, radically new and comprehensive means for control, manipulation, and self-design.

If all these developments, the first signs of which we are only just beginning to see, actually did materialize, then this would mean a sudden end to »old« modernity and »its« subjects. For the (fictitious) autonomous and »stable« self, which had to be carefully created through a (historic) process of civilization and (individual) socialization (see 118 and 119) – by means of manifold compulsions and their internalization –, is being dissolved in the course of the current social transformations. It must adopt to the norms of flexible capitalism and prove capable of change and mobility (see 120). In accordance with this »re-evaluation«, the »avant-garde« of the new age project themselves as »post-humans« (see as example 121) and leave the status of »humanity« to the subjected and marginalized, whose urge to finally receive full recognition as individuals is criticized and discredited as an old-fashioned insistence on core constructions (see 122).

From the communitarian perspective such phantasms are contrasted with an »*Ethics of Authenticity*« (123). It traces the essential source of ethics in the (old-fashioned) self and its intuitions – just as the individual, according to Taylor, conversely needs a moral frame for his/her self-realization. This kind of view is typical for communitarianism, which represents an important current counter-movement to the apologists of the new, and it seeks to emphasize communal values against a »bottomless« market liberalism. Thereby, however, it can be construed as predominantly conservative, primarily »deflexive«, defensive movement, which one-sidedly states that we are placed in a situation »*After Virtue*« (124).

Robert Putnam's analysis reflects this attitude, too: with his thesis of a »*Bowling Alone*« (125 and 126), which created a furor in the United States, he describes a crisis scenario for American society and, at the same time, touches upon the general question of what still keeps together (post)modern society. In this context he refers to the concept of »social capital«, which he describes as an essential necessity for a solid democracy and an efficient economy (see also 127). The basic idea of Putnam's version of social capital consists of the thesis that a person's family, friends and acquaintances represent an important value and hold, onto which one can fall back in crisis situations. Conversely, the communal engagement of individuals and their personal networks build a crucial social resource, on which every society must rely on in order to resolve conflicts and perform public tasks.

Putnam however asserts that at the present social capital is shrinking, and he advances his argument on the model of bowling (one of America's most popular sports activities): In the past, Americans of all social strata met with friends, in groups, and in associations to go bowling. Today, an increasing number of people go bowling »alone«, without the company of and communication with others. Yet, this is just the sign of a general development: the sense of community and the urge to come together is weakening and is leading to a continuously increasing detachment. If Putnam should prove to be correct, that could be called a *negative individualization*, which takes individuals out of their social networks without leading to new forms of bonding – a possible, a »real« danger, but at the same time a rather one-sided assumption.

4. NEW FORMS OF EMBEDMENT? – »THE STRENGTH OF WEAK TIES« AND POST-TRADITIONAL LIGATURES

Above, the effects of the most important current social processes of change – the globalization of politics, economy, and culture, changes in information technology and the revolution in genetic engineering – as well as their collective causes were illuminated primarily with regard to their disembedding, problematic outcomes for the individual as well as the community. Only a few optimistic positions were brought up. We have, therefore, been »warned«, have understood the voice(s) of fear. However, having faced this fear and critically acknowledged its justified »objections«, we can now ask ourselves: What spaces of opportunity are opened up in the course of these transformations? Aren't there, too, alongside the dissolving moments of individualization, traces of new, perhaps even less »coercive« mechanisms of the formation of community and social bonding?

It is precisely in this dialectics of risk and opportunity that Ulrich Beck and Anthony Giddens understand the processes of change in (reflexive) modern society. Individualization is conceived by Beck as an »historically contradictory process of societalization« (44: 119). By the separation

from existing »ligatures« and by the loss of traditional certainties generated in its wake, individualization possesses a dimension of liberation and »disenchantment«; on the other hand, there is inherent in it a moment of reintegration, too: new forms of social bonding and new structures arise (see 44: 206). Similarly, Giddens points out that the (time-spatial) »disembedding« processes of the social relationship patterns in the wake of the current radicalized and globalized modernization are accompanied by »reembedding« processes (see 128).

The dialectical movement of dissolution and re-formation possibly leads us into »*Another Modernity*« (129), the structures of which are, to be sure, still unclear – but maybe its characteristic is an altogether greater indeterminacy, plurality, and openness. Therefore, community is not necessarily dissolved, we are just facing other, less »uniform«, more fluid forms of social linking – and it is exactly this argument which one can (theoretically as well empirically) hold against Putnam and his thesis of a »bowling alone«, the declining of social capital. Such »loose connections« (see 130) or »weak ties« (see 131) are perhaps not as firmly joined; they can, however, – precisely because they are looser and consequently more flexible – be equally viable social resources: they represent a »communal« capital, on which society can be based (if one conceptualises society as dynamic and *beyond* a merely functional context). For in the same vein that a »patchwork-identity« by no means needs to be »pathological« but quite to the contrary makes it possible for individuals to express the various facets of their personality and – through multiple »fittings« – represents a way to escape the uniforming coercions of modern identity (see 132); so, too, can network-like, rather fluid social (group-)forms provide a foundation for commitment and solidarity that is compatible with the current, increasingly fluid conditions (see 133).

On the other hand: even if post-modern relations may more and more liquefy themselves (see 134) and therefore require »adapted« forms of social organization and social bonding – society cannot entirely dissolve into a disjunctive stream of disparate flows. The total liquefaction, the unrestrained capitulation to the conditions of a flexible capitalism, leads to the »liquidation« of social relations. For (metaphorically explained): every river requires a bed, and if it still does not possess one, it will – meandering – create one. Social action thus requires, as does the river require its bed, a »place«, a (communal) embedment. Bell hooks describes vividly, how only the localization in an atmosphere of security – in her case the house of her grandmother in the midst of a hostile »white« environment – granted to her the strength and the stimulus for resistance against racist oppression; a resistance which raises precisely from the yearning that »home« should be everywhere. In this way, resistant solidarity may arise even from an endangered marginal position – when the positive experience of communal embedment is present as a foundation to rely on (see 135). Such »linking« places, such places of »refuge« can be either real or »imaginary«. It might be, say, the attic hideout of our childhood, to which we return in day-dreams, or the promising distant light on the horizon, towards which we set out (see 136). Those real-and-imagined »homeplaces« lead us potentially to a »third space«

of difference (see 137), to that »heterotopic« *other spaces*, which is not simply overlapping or identical with present (social) space, but rather opens new opportunities for autonomy and difference for us (see 138) – i.e. an utopian »space of hope« (139).

In his concept of »*Life Chances*« (140), Ralf Dahrendorf points out the importance of embedment not only for resistance and utopian thought but for the existence of »social ties« in general. In his view, liberal democracy makes available to the individual an abundance of options. By options Dahrendorf understands choices and alternatives which are at the disposal of a person in his/her respective societal position and situation. All options are, however, devoid of meaning, unless they are joined with »ligatures«: secured frames of reference, forms of embedment and ties. Ligatures, then, refer to a person's references to meaning, community and place that provide him/her with orientation, while options represent the contingency dimension of social action spaces, and only in combined they converge on what Dahrendorf calls »life chances«. In the course of argument he points out that modernization inevitably means the expansion of choices. Capitalist modernization, however, produced its (quasi) options through the splitting of ligatures. This dissolution of traditional relations and frames of reference can be no linear process, at the end of which stands an individual that can only be described via his/her wealth of options. At a certain point the choices gained by the destruction of traditional ligatures lose their meaning, for: »Ligatures without options are oppressive whereas options without bonds are meaningless.« (140: 31)

Ligatures are therefore necessary, unless we wish to wind up in a social vacuum of completely detached virtual »flows«. Still, in our view, these ligatures need not necessarily be traditional – that is, (pre-)existing – ligatures, as Dahrendorf believes (see 140: 75). It is also possible that »posttraditional« ligatures will emerge, which create similar forms of embedment in a different way to give these options meaning – however are, for the most part, (*inter-actively (self-)created and kept alive*). One can even go further and assert: Only through this kind of posttraditional ligatures, which must necessarily give space to plurality and difference, the complex and diverse challenges of today can be met. Otherwise, a »fundamentalistic« (backwards) orientation is impending, which not only seeks to combat the aberrations of modernization but also eliminates the achievements of the modern age (see 141).

What, then, could posttraditional ligatures consist of? Scott Lash provides one indication. He, too, asserts that community depends on bonds, that is, for him: shared references to life and sense – common meanings. Yet, today the plane of common meaning is most likely to be found in the field of aesthetics (see 142). In the »aesthetic« or »culture society« (see 143 and 144), which is deeply penetrated by the consumer-culture of advanced capitalism (see e.g. 145 and 146), significance is created by signs and symbols and no longer just represented by them. Therefore, societalization can be established on this basis, too. Particularly when one considers the (so frequently denounced) youth-, pop-, and subculture, one will find that it is indeed

the signs, symbols and cultural products, their aesthetic appeal, which primarily constitutes the core of social positioning. They become enriched with »conventional« meaning only in the course of further interaction – perhaps when through listening to HipHop, the political interest in one's particular »ghetto«-situation. It is therefore very well possible that *resistive solidary action* arises from *the creative processing of everyday life* (see 147 and 148). There is, of course, always the danger that the trace of difference, which is laid in the aesthetic and its »unbound« sensibility, becomes fragmented or – economically transformed and utilized – finally fades into conformity (see also 149 and 150).

Some movements like, say, »culture jamming«, which decontextualizes brand symbols, or the »reclaim the streets«-movement, which intends to counter the privatization of public space, turn therefore explicitly against the global culture industry (see 151). This shows: Political engagement need no longer happen exclusively within (national) political institutions or parties, but often takes place within the framework of globally active NGOs or informal oppositional networks (as in the case of the so-called »anti-globalists«). And instead of positioning in the narrow local or familial sphere, many individuals engage in virtual communities (see 152) or transnational social spaces (see 153), which overlap territorial boundaries as a »third dimension«, and represent – empirically measurable – an immense capital (see 154). This, however, consequently means: People no longer form by necessity static relationship patterns but rather constitute (self-selected and -designed) mobile »figurations« (see also 155).

Certainly, at present one still rarely encounters such quite cosmopolitan orientations (see 156), yet, cosmopolitanism is an increasingly relevant factor, especially as an individual value orientation. For, paradoxically, it is precisely the tribulated self of radicalized modernity, that, via a detour through the private, heads back into (global) public space. This is what Anthony Giddens calls »life politics«: »[...] life politics concerns political issues which flow from processes of self-actualisation in post-traditional contexts, where globalizing influences intrude deeply into the reflexive project of the self, and conversely where processes of self-realisation influence global strategies.« (157: 214) This brings a whole series of new moral and political questions to the fore: What is humanity's responsibility to nature? What are the limits of scientific and technological innovation? What rights and obligations do individuals have with respect to their bodies? In a similar vein, Ulrich Beck speaks of the »social morality of one's own life«, which effects a reinvention of the political – beyond the established institutions, in the »underground« of everyday life. Admittedly, such a »subpolitics« always is, like the community of the aesthetic, at risk of becoming diffused, fragmented, or bogged down in neighbourhood issues – and thus ending up in a non-politics (see 8: 362–375). On the other hand, it ought not to be overlooked that subpolitics and their posttraditional bonding forms – taken seriously – contain a considerable potential. In what follows we wish to present some short examples from our (qualitative) empirical work, which, in our opinion, provide striking proof, that there are first indicators pointing to

the existence of posttraditional ligatures, and that these represent, for both the individual and the community, a significant »social capital«.

Our first example concerns posttraditional ligatures in the double sense of the word. One may here detect »traditional« elements, but elements which clearly point beyond the regular forms, too: Mrs. N., »housewife« and mother of two children (ages 4 and 6), lives with her family in a suburb of a large south German city. Her husband works as a computer scientist in a software company. At first glance, a typical bourgeois nuclear family with a classic distribution of gender roles, as we have been able to observe them for decades. Upon a closer observation, however, this picture changes. Family N. chose to live there not only because they sought the comfort and tranquillity of a suburb, but rather on account of the proximity to Mr. N's workplace: as due to the compassion to a thoroughly posttraditional value – ecology – they decided not to own a car. The husband's company, however, is considering the relocation of their site. Family N. plans to change residence accordingly. Mrs N. believes this will not present a big problem to her. For she has integrated this (immobile) mobility pattern into the design of her social network. Aside from family contact, her activities centre on a so-called »local exchange trading system«: an network of people who perform reciprocal services. The »media« of local network consist of monthly meetings, a trade journal, listing offers and inquiries, and a fictitious currency – which forms the basis on which the various services performed are balanced (applying the principle of an exchange of equivalents). Mrs N. is involved in the local exchange trading system to have her own meaningful sphere of action aside from the »traditional« work of a housewife and child rearer. For Mrs N., however, the persons of this network are less relevant as individuals but primarily in their function for her »positioning«. Active participation (she plays a key role in organizing the group and, in this way, contributes considerably to the community, too) assures her local integration. She knows many locals and many know her, without the obligation to enter closer relationships. A structure provides like this bears the advantage that it can be »taken along« any time the family moves (for example by starting one's »own« exchange net in case there is no comparable structure at the new place of residence). It is, therefore, indeed a »mobile«, easily »transferable« kind of network, even if it is firmly embedded locally. And the result is, in spite of the relative de-personalization of non-family relationships, a sense of embedment, which is – in addition to the fun of doing it – the motivational source of Mrs N.'s involvement.

The second example of the binding potential of posttraditional ligatures is a group of young Turkish *second generation*-immigrant families, which has existed for over ten years – and consequently already has established a certain type of »tradition«. This »tradition« includes monthly meetings and common activities. Obviously, this is a rather »substitutive« network to replace the – even within the group of Turkish immigrants – increasingly crumbling institution of the extended family, as all members concurrently referred to their group as a (large) family: a simulated »meta-family«, as one might conclude, which provides security in a situation of (ascribed) »otherness«. For although most group members have been born and/or raised in

the country, they experience a lack of full social acceptance, suffer from social exclusion. The group makes discrimination their central topic, and, in the future, wants to feature it – also politically – in the public debate. Apart from this, »social intercourse«, common conversations, and the exchange of experiences (mostly concerning child-rearing and partnership issues) feature most prominently. The group, therefore, indeed fulfills/substitutes for certain family functions. On the other hand: the model of the extended family is not one they intend to imitate feature for feature. Anyway, it is not within the realm of concrete experience for most group members, who frequently come from familial contexts torn apart by immigration, and thus are less likely to be firmly embedded in family than many non-immigrants. Thus, the integration in the group network is modelled according to the, (sub-)culturally shaped, »image« of the extended family, however it is looser and above all: it rests on voluntarism and allows to everyone to shape his/her life in ones own fashion. In spite of this, the group provides support, and constitutes a solidary context, which may even exceed the limits of »real« family ties. A striking example of this is the report of a young mother, who, after an apartment fire, unsuccessfully waited for concrete offers of help from her family and relatives, while among friends within the group she found immediate shelter and support – a subject, which the young woman still has not processed and which represents great disappointments. However, this reveals how »supportive« posttraditional ligatures can be.

Finally we wish address to the example of Timo (name changed) and his group context. Timo, like his female partner, is of bisexual orientation. Both, however, renounce to realize this inclination – not because they might have some moral compunction, but rather because they know it would not benefit their relationship. There are other issues that cast a shadow over the partnership: an illness which for Timo will probably prove fatal. In spite of this, Timo does not give the impression of being a depressed, withdrawn or to have surrendered. On the contrary, both partners are involved in a group, which advocates the rights of refugees. That work is, says Timo, a lot of fun – which for him is very important. And unlike many others, this group assigns an active role to the refugees. Occasionally, that leads to problems of intercultural communication, however it constitutes at the same time the special appeal of this group. Here, one commits oneself, as Timo points out, not at distance to issues of the so-called »Third World« but one rather deals with the distinct problems that arise *on the local level* from the clash of different worlds. Initially the group, which evaluates and performs an egalitarian culture of discussion as well as a non-hierarchical self-organization, formed itself merely for the purpose of organizing a big political event, but then remained in place. Timo joined the group quite by chance, and is not sure if he will stay with the group for long time. In spite of this »contingency« of his involvement, he is deeply committed to the group and its goals. He also derives much strength from his commitment – the discussions and activities set free energies, as he says. Moreover, being imbedded in this group constitutes, aside from his relationship, an important source for finding meaning in his life. Thus, as fleeting and accidental as his involvement may

be – it provides Timo with the security he so desperately needs in his situation, and the activities within the group, at present, matter even more to him than, for example, his parents.

These are, of course, only some examples. But we believe that they provide »exemplary« proof that the current social transformation processes – however critically they are to be viewed – not only lead to the dissolution of social ties. To us, there are encouraging indications for the formation of posttraditional ligatures: social ties, which tolerate difference, plurality and the striving for self-realization. Let us, then, read these changes with regard to the spaces of opportunity they are opening up, and, instead of being paralysed by fear, let us contribute *actively* to prevent that the horrible in the possible will become true, and ensure that – in critical consciousness of the dangers looming on the horizon – we (resistantly) approach the »sanctuary« of our imagination.

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